FILE PHOTO: Bogus doctor, Matthew Lani was arrestesd at the Helen Joseph Hospital in Johannesburg on Sunday night. PICTURE: Instagram/Matthwe Lani
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0 The freedom fighters stole cars in South Africa and then imported them to Zambia for their own benefit, WRITES MOLIFI TSHABALALA
In recent months, a few universities in South Africa have had to issue statements in which they distanced themselves from certain popular figures who had claimed to hold qualifications from them. University of Witwatersrand, otherwise known as Wits University, is but one such institution.
It has refuted a claim by a TikTok influencer who goes by the name of Dr Matthew Lani that he graduated from its medical school. “Based on the names presented to the institution, and the facts on hand, the University cannot find any person who graduated by the name of Matthew Bongani Zingelwa or Sanele Zingelwa in recent years,” reads a statement from the university. Sternly, it requested him “to retract any such claims with immediate effect.”
In his own defence, the rogue doctor, who allegedly issued medical advice to his 280,000 followers, said Lani is his social media handle, that is, not his real surname, which is Zingelwa. Yet, the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) could not find evidence of his registration as a medical practitioner either.
According to the Department of Health, Zingelwa has impersonated a second-year medical intern at Tembisa Provincial Tertiary Hospital. In line with an amended Health Professions Act (56 of 1974), the department has opened a case against Lani at the Brixton police station in Johannesburg, Gauteng.
The Act stipulates that practising as a medical practitioner without being registered with the HPCSA is a criminal offence. Incidentally, the medical intern has also opened a case against the 27-year-old for identity fraud.
Lani, who boasted about being the youngest doctor who owns a pharmaceutical company, got arrested. However, the charges against him have been withdrawn on the basis that he did not lie under oath.
This speaks of how centrifugal intra-African National Congress (ANC) factionalism has destroyed the country’s criminal justice system, more specifically, the Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigation (DPCI) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which are key law enforcement enablers.
In his book, External Mission, Stephen Ellis paints a picture of how corruption became endemic within the governing party in exile. Mostly, he says, the freedom fighters stole cars in South Africa and then imported them to Zambia for their own benefit.
In doing so, the freedom fighters took advantage of permission given to the liberation movement by the Zambian government to import cars duty-free from South Africa for its operational uses.
For some of the exile returnees, a 1994 democratic dispensation thus provided them with access to state resources to enrich themselves. “I didn’t join the [liberation] struggle to be poor,” as Smuts Ngonyana put it.
Even some among the latecomers (that is, the non-freedom fighters) have jumped on the bandwagon of the gravy train. Delivering a political report at the 50th ANC National Conference, held in December 1997 in Mahikeng, North West, Nelson Mandela described them as careerists who “see their membership of the ANC as a means to advance their personal ambitions to attain positions of power and access to [state] resources for their own individual gratification.”
In the early 2000s, the ANC-led government under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, established the NPA, which, among other units, comprised the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), dubbed the Scorpions, to fight organised crime. Through the DSO, the NPA, which acts on behalf of the state, used a prosecution-led model. Hence, it had a high prosecutorial success rate.
On Saturday, 23 August 2003, then National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) Bulelani Ngcuka announced that while the state had prima facie evidence of corruption against Jacob Zuma, then a deputy president of both the ANC and South Africa, he had decided not to charge him. Flanked by then minister of justice and constitutional development, Penuell Maduna, at a press conference, Ngcuka claimed that the case against him was unwinnable.
Ironically, he charged one of his prime accomplices and former financial adviser Shabir Shaik with counts of corruption and fraud. Between April 1995 (a year into the democratic dispensation) and September 2002, the disgraced businessman paid Zuma over R1.4 million, revealing the state during his trial.
“Instead of just stabilising the situation and managing Zuma’s chaotic finances,” stated a judge, “Shaik then made it possible for Zuma to continue living beyond his means by the payments.” Shaik’s conviction of 15 years in prison had, in essence, greatly implicated Zuma in the same counts of crimes, thereby leaving Mbeki with no choice but to fire him as his South African deputy president.
It did not rain but poured for Zuma, whom Ngcuka’s successor, Vusumuzi ‘Vusi’ Pikoli, charged with the same and other counts of crimes, such as money laundering and racketeering, totalling 783 charges. Despite a dark cloud of the allegations that swirled over his head, his coterie, which comprised former Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) secretary-general Zwelinzima Vavi and former South African Communist Party (SACP) secretary-general Bonginkosi ‘Blade’ Nzimande as well as former ANC secretary-general Elias ‘Ace’ Magashule, among others, had thrown their weight behind him to take on Mbeki for an ANC presidency at the 52nd National Conference, held in December 2007.
At that time, from Ngcuka’s announcement to the 52nd ANC National Conference to be precise, corruption had become a main intra-party factional conflict. At the same conference, the party resolved to disband the DSO, claiming that the directorate targeted its leaders.
The DSO has been replaced with the DPCI, dubbed the Hawks. Unlike the DSO, the Hawks is placed within the South African Police Service (SAPS).
Therefore, it investigates cases and then sends dockets to the NPA to decide on whether to prosecute or not. In cases of insufficient evidence, the NPA reverts the dockets to the DPCI for further investigations. This greatly impinges on its prosecutorial success rate. With the DPCI as its unit, the NPA would have decided during an investigative stage whether to charge Lani or not.
In fact, corruption has become the main intra-party factional conflict to the extent that Cyril Ramaphosa used it, along with the economy in the main, to successfully vie for the ANC presidency. To intensify the fight against it, he established the Investigating Directorate (ID), located within the NDPP’s office.
However, it is specifically dealing with the so-called state capture cases. Prior to its establishment, some among the ANC leaders had been toying with DSO’s re-establishment, thereby indirectly admitting that the resolution to disband the directorate was misguided and myopic.
***Tshabalala is an author and independent political analyst.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Republic Mail and its associates.
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